In 1981, an opinion piece featured in the New York Times discussed a novel change at the Harvard Club, located just off of Times Square. “In the main dining room, beyond the giant fireplaces and mounted animal heads, flanked by grand portraits of Theodore Roosevelt and John Kennedy, a new facility is now arrayed across the south wall: a sushi bar.” [1] This was a revolutionary moment, claimed the author, as the acceptance of sushi showed the acceptance of Japanese culture. It was logical for Americans to consume Japanese products that had been altered to fit American tastes, with products like the California Roll becoming a staple of American sushi. Yet, the consumption of something like sushi, which was authentically Japanese, highlighted a new cultural acceptance. While sake consumption was down in Japan, it had risen in America over 20 percent from 1980 to 1981.[2] Less than one decade later in 1989, Chicago’s Pulitzer Prize–winning writer Mike Royko presented sushi in a different light in an article he wrote for the St. Petersburg Times.
In a couple of hundred years, when historians study the decline and fall of the once-great nation known as the United States, they will pinpoint April 1989, as the beginning of the end. The fall began with the deterioration of traditional values, the rejection of our heritage, the plunge into cultural decadence and effeteness… And historians will be able to look to Southern California to see where it all began. They will find that in April 1989, the San Diego Padres became the first major league franchise in the long history of America’s great national pastime to sell–brace yourselves–sushi to fans. [3]
Although tongue-in-cheek, Royko’s argument showed a growing fear within the United States as Japanese life seeped into American culture. Sushi was acceptable, however, there was a need for the Japanese to remain in their proper place. Throughout history, Japan had remained economically subordinate to its mentor, the United States. However, the financial success of the Japanese throughout the 1970s and into the following decade worried many Americans, who feared an oncoming “economic Pearl Harbor.” [4]
Japanese culture could be admired by Americans, as was the case with the introduction of sushi at the Harvard Club, but there had to be boundaries. Baseball, for example, was and continues to be the symbol of American sports, and is arguably the most popular sport in Japan.[5] While peanuts and Cracker Jack could be substituted by hotdogs and Pepsi products, the introduction of something quite literally foreign into something that was America’s pride and joy led some Americans beginning to think that the embrace of Japanese culture had gone much too far within the United States. It is also worth noting that Royko was not alone in fearing that the Japanese could become so strong that they would be able to take over the nation that had nurtured them and allowed them to develop into a global power.
Throughout the 1970s, relations between the United States and Japan remained positive. Thirty-five years after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and other American naval bases, the Pacific Daily News, which published out of Guam but reported American news, remembered the event on its anniversary in 1976. The paper stated that “looking at the war in retrospect after those 35 years, it becomes easier to see the Japanese rationale although we still do not agree with it. The Japanese felt that they were being isolated from the raw materials they needed to build their nation… When negotiations failed the Japanese turned to force in an attempt to save their homeland. It was wrong, and we think that the Japanese realize that it was wrong.” [6] Yet, with the 1970s oil crisis following OPEC’s steep increase in oil prices, as well as the Nixon shock when the then-president took the American dollar off the gold standard, there was a massive appreciation of the yen throughout the decade. Although the Japanese economy seemed worrisome, there was no looming fear among the American people during the 1970s that the Japanese would be in a position to challenge the United States as they had decades before.
The positive opinion Americans had of Japan changed with the onset of the following decade, as Americans once again saw Japan as a threatening nation coming to power, albeit not militarily as it had been in the 1940s. In 1981, the New York Times published a piece written by the President of the National Maritime Union of America, warning of an oncoming “economic Pearl Harbor.” [7] As the Times had advocated dismantling the merchant marines, the President of the National Maritime Union of America stated that by doing so, national security would fall into foreign hands. It was claimed that the United States had already given away “our steel industry, our shipbuilding industry, our automobile industry, our electronics industry, our textile industry… [on the basis of] principles of ‘'free trade’ which are observed by no other nation, particularly Japan.” [8] While the Japanese sent their goods to the United States, they had protected their own markets, insomuch as that the author argued that Japan had taken to caring for America as if it were their own colony, with “a distant province supplying natural resources to an industrial parent state.” [9] It seemed as if the Japanese had begun to step out of their proper place.
The United States was not the only western power that felt threatened by Japan’s economic dominance. A different New York Times article stated that America and other European nations, “faced with mounting trade deficits with Japan, … [had] started all-out campaigns to try to open up what they regard as the clam-like economic system of Japan. Foreigners charge that there are many Japanese markets that can be exceedingly difficult to crack, including those for beef, citrus fruits, pharmaceuticals, financial services, communications equipment and computers.” [10] Even without restrictive policies in place regarding trade itself, Americans believed that Japan had forced out the competition in its domestic markets, implementing rules and regulations that hurt the sales of American goods in Japan.
An example of Japanese protectionism can be seen in relation to baseball bats. With a rise in the sale of American-made baseball bats in Japan, incidents where the product malfunctioned were highly publicized, even if the bat was made by a Japanese company. As a result, standards were set for bats that were used in hardball games. Still, this was not the most blatant attack on American goods. The Japan Rubberized Baseball League, which
monitored bats used by its members… openly told representatives of American sporting goods companies that it will not put its stamp [which is required for a bat to be used in a league game] on a foreign-made bat. They've even put it in writing. One executive of an American company produced a letter he received last month from Shinzo Fukuda, secretary general of the league, which contained the sentence: ‘The league has decided not to give our stamp of approval to any foreign producers.’ [11]
By eliminating market competition within Japan, the nation had taken aggressive measures in order to ensure its own dominance in a field that had been monopolized by the United States for an extended period of time.
As Japan’s economy thrived due to supposed domestic protectionism, that of the United States began to suffer. Faced with the rising price of gas, Americans looked for fuel-efficient cars. A 1977 Chevrolet Chevette averaged between 28 to 42 miles per gallon while a 1977 Toyota Corolla averaged between 36 to 49.[12] Ford and General Motors continued to sell over 50 percent of new cars in the United States throughout the entirety of the 20th century, but the percentage they held began to drop. In 1971, the two companies combined sold 69.83 percent of new cars sold. Ten years later, in 1981, that number dropped to 62.64 percent and by 1991, only 57.81 percent of new cars sold within the United States were produced by Ford or General Motors.[13] In contrast, The New York Times reported in the early months of 1980 that “in the first four months of 1980, Toyota’s shipments to the United States rose 25 percent, to 243,959 units, from the year-earlier 194,378.” [14] While a relatively small drop in market share seems inconsequential, massive layoffs in the automotive industry began in the late 1970s. On November 9, 1979, The New York Times reported that “General Motors, the nation's largest automobile company, said it was placing 5,750 employees on indefinite layoff status, bringing the total number of its laid‐off workers to 37,250… Ford, the No. 2 manufacturer, took actions that involved 24,300 workers, bringing its layoff total to 53,800.” [15] For those who kept their jobs, there was little ability to complain about poor working conditions. On an especially hot day at Chrysler Corporation's Warren Truck plant, it would have been the norm for workers to “leave and take a walk until things cooled down. It got hot inside the plant in nearby Warren a few weeks ago, but hardly a word of complaint was heard — never mind a walkout.” [16]
At the same time when sales of Japanese cars continued to rise, American car manufacturers, such as Ford and General Motors, began to face issues with their cars. In the late months of 1979, Ford was charged with three counts of reckless homicide as a result of three teenage girls dying in a 1973 Pinto after it exploded. The Detroit Free Press, located just over 8 miles east of Ford’s headquarters, printed a story stating that official crash tests could possibly be used in the trial could showcase that “Ford knew the 1973 Pinto was defective… [and that] crash tests on later-model Pintos… [would show that] the automaker found evidence of Pinto safety defects after the 1973-model year but took no corrective action. Again, it hoped to show later models were virtually the same as the 1973 model.” [17] The Detroit Free Press also noted that a $4 million dollar settlement from General Motors could grow to $17 million, “depending on the lifetime of 19-year-old Deana Lucas, of Napa Calif., who was badly burned when the gasoline tank of her 1967 Buick Opel exploded in a collision.” [18] Lawsuits against the American auto industry continued to increase. Mark Robinson Jr., who represented Deana Lucas and other victims suing companies such as Ford and General Motors, stated that “in these cases, the jury sees a state of mind (by the automakers) that just doesn’t care about safety.” [19] While American auto manufacturers had avoided focusing on safety, this was already an important feature of Japanese cars. There were no reports of Toyotas or Nissans killing individuals who drove their cars, as was the case with Ford and General Motors.
It was not until the 1980s that Americans began recognizing the dominance the Japanese held economically. In an effort to express their frustration, Americans began targeting Japanese products. In 1992, the Washington Post reported that “swept up in the recent wave of animosity against Japan, Americans here and there have been letting off steam with some literal Japan-bashing. They find an old Honda or Toyota sedan and start bashing away at it with a sledgehammer.” [20] Although this article was from the early 1990s, Americans had begun smashing Japanese goods much earlier. In 1987, 6 “sledgehammer-wielding members of Congress gathered on the Capitol lawn and smashed a Toshiba radio.” [21] In Detroit, Michigan, individuals paid one dollar in order to smash a Toyota with a sledgehammer, with the money raised going to help those that had been laid off, mainly by United States auto manufacturers, who had suffered as Japanese car companies began to take their share of sales. Although these acts did not target the Japanese themself, these expressions of violence showed how frustrated Americans had become with Japanese success within the United States. Rather than the United States as the economically dominant nation, Americans felt that the Japanese had stepped away from their proper place, surpassing them in an area where the United States had always reigned supreme.
However, this violent expression of aggression was not solely targeted at Japanese products. In the summer of 1982, Vincent Chin, a Chinese engineer, was beaten to death by two white men with a baseball bat in Highland Park, Michigan, just outside the city of Detroit. One of the men, Ronald Ebens, was a Chrysler plant supervisor. The other was his stepson, a laid-off autoworker named Michael Nitz. While out one night, Nitz and Ebens saw Chin and assumed that he was of Japanese descent. The two men, upset with the current economic situation within the United States, blamed Chin for the success of Japan's auto industry. Although the men were originally charged with second-degree murder, the men were allowed to plead guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced to pay fines totaling $6,000 and ordered to serve three years’ probation. This lenient sentencing was rationalized by the judge, who stated in the Detroit Free Press that “we’re talking here about a man (Ebens) who’s held down a responsible job with the same company for 17 or 18 years and his son (Nitz) who is employed and a part-time student. These men are not going to go out and harm somebody else.” [22] However, this sentencing was not acceptable to many, who felt as if there had been so little value given to “the life of one of its [the Chinese community’s] members.” [23] According to the judge, no civil rights had been violated in Chin’s murder, although individuals claimed the perpetrators had used racial slurs against Chin. A Detroit resident named Faith Blizzard asked “how can you kill someone without violating his or her civil rights? This verdict will go down in American judicial history as a gross miscarriage of justice.” [24] In a similar vein, Kin Yee, the president of the Detroit Chinese Welfare Council, told the New York Times that the lenient sentence gave Americans “a license to kill for $3,000, provided you have a steady job or are a student and the victim is Chinese.” [25] Many believed that if the races of the perpetrators and victims had been reversed, the sentence would have been much harsher.
In 1979, Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel published his book Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America, which discussed how Japan had “consciously transformed itself sector by sector—in government, education, business, the military, and law—to catch up with and surpass the West. Japan also placed great value on technical expertise, but placed specialists within a group setting so that cohesiveness was not destroyed by modernization.” [26] By revolutionizing the nation, Japan had increased economic productivity, its ability to govern efficiently, and the education of its citizens. At the same time, Japan controlled crime, alleviated energy shortages, and better-controlled its pollution. Although more than likely written in jest, an article in The New York Times titled “Please, Japan, Return The Favor: Occupy Us,” in which the author pleaded with the Japanese to “to come here, occupy us, and do exactly those things we did for them from 1945 to 1952,” [27] which included–but was not limited to–amending the Constitution, destroying American weapons unless they were advanced enough to be sent back to Japan for further study, and forcing Americans to learn Japanese in order to interact with the occupiers. While the piece ended with an ideal situation in which “the occupation would end with no legacy of ill will between the two nations,” [28] there was a fear that “the Japanese, having taught the Americans, having been their masters, might find it difficult to learn anything from the Americans when the time came that we had something to teach” [29] should the time ever come again where Americans would hold the upper hand.
Japan began purchasing American companies as early as 1985 with their acquisition of Rouge Steel Corporation, which was located in Detroit, Michigan, and originally owned by Ford. This location produced an impressive 2.5 million tons of steel each year and employed 6,000 workers, making it the nation's eighth-largest steel company. Months before the purchase, the Detroit Free Press stated that “the Rouge steel mill is interwoven with history and mythology of industrial Detroit,” [30] a city that had begun to decay. The shock of this sale was minimized by another jolting announcement, as Ford disclosed that it would eliminate 10,000 jobs throughout the country weeks after the sale was finalized. In 1988, Japan’s Bridgestone Corp. outbid Italian tiremaker Pirelli. to purchase Firestone Tire & Rubber in an all-cash deal. In 1986, Firestone had ranked fourth among tiremakers worldwide in sales, behind other well-known brands such as Goodyear, Michelin, and Bridgestone. Although Pirelli had offered $1.93 billion, Bridgestone had offered a substantial amount more, allowing the Firestone Company to be sold for nearly $2.6 billion. While the Firestone acquisition was a major purchase, it would be surpassed just one year later in 1989 as Japan’s Sony purchased America’s Columbia Pictures for $3.4 billion in cash, making it the biggest acquisition in the United States by a Japanese company. In California’s The Napa Valley Register, a two-hour drive from Columbia’s headquarters, it was reported that
with the purchase of Columbia Pictures Inc., Japan’s Sony Corp. is acquiring some of the most treasured American films ever made, everything from the classic drama ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ to the classic slapstick of ‘The Three Stooges.’… Along Sony’s new holdings will be 11 films that have won Academy Awards as Best Picture, including two with themes that were anti-Japanese. ‘From Here to Eternity’ in 1953 climaxed with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor that drew the United States into World War II. ‘The Bridge on the River Kwai’ in 1957, portrayed inhumane conditions in a Japanese-run prison camp. [31]
Although an analysis of the transaction in 2014 by Sea-Jin Chang, the author of “Samsung vs. Sony” and a business professor at Singapore University, claimed that Sony’s purchase of Columbia Pictures was nothing more than a “trophy purchase,” [32] Japan had acquired one of the crown jewels of American entertainment.
In addition to the tangible effects felt by the American public that came from an increase in Japanese economic dominance, Japanese investors began to engage in a buying spree of commercial real estate within the United States. In 1986, Shuwa Corporation, a Japanese real estate developer, looked to add other expensive buildings to their $2 billion dollars of U.S. real estate holdings. In 1986, the New York Daily News reported that “Capital Cities/ABC Inc., the company that runs the American Broadcasting Co., has just sold ABC’s headquarters building at 1330 Sixth Ave. The buyer: Shuwa Corp… Real-estate sources say the selling price was about $165 million.” [33] One year later, in 1987, the Daily News wrote about another large-scale Japanese investment. “Japanese investors [they wrote], who for the past year have been slicing up choice Manhattan real estate with the spress and dexterity of sushi chefs, have agreed to purchase the massive Mobil Building, the oil company said yesterday.” [34] Across the country, in an article titled “Cash Rich Japanese Step Up Purchase of U.S. Property,” [35] The San Francisco Examiner stated that Shuwa “has bought an estimated $400 million worth of buildings and land in Los Angeles alone,” [36] including the Arco Plaza in downtown L.A. for an estimated price of $650 million. In a quote from the president of Okada International Corporation, the New York broker that represented Shuwa, Naomi Okada, stated that “it’s very hard to buy property in Japan” [37] so investors had begun to look elsewhere, including the United States.
The climax of Japanese investment occurred in late 1989 when the Mitsubishi company purchased 51 percent of Rockefeller Center for $846 million. In a piece from the New York Times, the president of the Mitsubishi estate was quoted saying that “there is no business address in the world that has the same cachet as Rockefeller Center. It is synonymous with excellence. We are making this investment with the objective of continuing this tradition into the 21st century, sharing with the Rockefeller family the vision of the center as a very special place in New York City, and of the city itself as a world capital of business and culture.” [38] However, that address no longer belonged to the Rockefeller family, who was an American namesake. With this purchase, Mitsubishi became the landlord of some of the United State’s biggest companies, including General Electric, NBC, Time Warner, Price Waterhouse, and Morgan Stanley. While the purchase was seen as economically beneficial for both parties, with Mitsubishi buying an American name while the Rockefeller family gave away a substantial tax problem that could have cost them hundreds of millions of dollars, the American public did not think fondly of the transaction. In an article from The L.A. Times, New Yorker James Hesslin commented on the alleged American weakness that allowed the transaction to take place. He stated that “I’m disturbed like a lot of people [over the purchase]… We seem to be selling the country away. New York is like that, Los Angeles is like that. The Japanese are buying property all over.” [39] Tove Borgnine, a cosmetics company owner, said that seeing Japan buy an American landmark was “very sad.” [40] Although Borgnine stated that she meant no disrespect to the Japanese, she added that “this is our land,” [41] as if signifying that the Japanese had no right to purchase the property.
While there was a fear among some Americans that Japan would buy more iconic American companies and buildings, other Americans felt the need to suppress these feelings. It was reported in The Atlantic that American politicians and business people were
reluctant to do anything that would aggravate Japan's ever-present fears that the rest of the world is about to gang up on it and exclude it. The last time Japan felt left out was in the 1930s, when it started down the road to fascist nationalism after it suffered a number of international snubs… The country's military leadership was convinced (and Japanese students are now taught) that the West had decided to choke Japan to death, with boycotts, so Japan might as well strike, [42]
leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan, then, from the perspective of some Americans, should be handled with kid gloves in times of uncertainty. Although the nation had begun to dominate within the economic sphere, it was argued that “friends must sometimes help friends break destructive habits… If Japan cannot restrain the excesses of its own economy, then the United States, to save its partnership with Japan, should impose limits from outside.” [43] Rather than fear Japan, American economists claimed that the job of the United States should be to aid Japan, helping the nation to find its proper place in the global economy. Through this, Japan would be guided back into a position that Americans deemed fit.
Although Japanese companies were critiqued by the American populace, Americans felt that their government had catered to the wants of the Japanese. In the final months of his presidency, President Ronald Reagan used his political power in an attempt to “right a grave wrong.” [44] On August 10, 1988, Reagan acknowledged the mistake the United States had made during the Second World War by signing the Civil Liberties Act, which compensated over 100,000 people of Japanese descent who had been incarcerated in American internment camps during World War II, paying them each $20,000 in restitution compensation. While the bill was in the House of Representatives, the bill's principal advocate, Senator Spark M. Matsunaga (D-HI), a Japanese-American from Hawaii, almost wept as he recalled the suffering of internees. As reported in the New York Times, Senator Matsunaga recalled the story of an “elderly man who crossed a fence to retrieve a ball for his grandchild and was machine-gunned to death as a result.” [45] In addition to this, Reagan offered a formal apology to those who had been impacted by Executive Order 9066, which had authorized the internment. In his speech before he signed the bill into law, Reagan made reference to the heroic actions of Japanese-Americans who had fought for the United States during the war. “Japanese-Americans in the tens of thousands remained utterly loyal to the United States. Indeed, scores of Japanese-Americans volunteered for our Armed Forces, many stepping forward in the internment camps themselves. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team, made up entirely of Japanese-Americans, served with immense distinction to defend this nation, their nation. Yet back at home, the soldiers' families were being denied the very freedom for which so many of the soldiers themselves were laying down their lives.” [46] While the legislation itself could not undo the harm done over forty years ago, there was a need for those in power to recognize what internment was: a mistake.
Although the signing of this bill was heralded as a monumental moment for the Japanese-American community, with the national vice president of the Japanese American Citizens League being quoted in The Fresno Bee saying that the legislation “is symbolic of what we [Japanese-Americans] had asked for–a formal government recognition of the injustices we endured,” [47] other Americans were not as celebratory. In the same edition of that paper, albeit regarding a separate piece of legislation, California Assemblymember Marian La Follette (R-CA 38) said that “there should be no apology or reparations to ‘anyone involved on the other side of that war… I cannot forgive the many sorrows that their government brought to us.’ Asked later if she supported the internment, she replied, ‘I thought that was the most humane treatment that any country has displayed against an enemy during an actual conflict or during an actual war.’” [48] Although La Follette’s remarks were quickly criticized, she was not alone in this sentiment. While the Civil Liberties Act was in Congress, several members attempted to make amendments that would undercut the purpose it was meant to serve. In The New York Times, Senator Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Carolina, tried “unsuccessfully to attach amendments barring the reparations and allowing them only if payments also were provided by Japan for the survivors of American servicemen killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor.” [49] In a similar vein, Republican Senator Malcolm Wallop, from Wyoming and an opponent of the bill, stated that “honor cannot be purchased [and] called the internment ‘the option of a nation in the first days of a war.’” [50] Although many Americans felt that reparations were needed, tensions remained high among others who continued to see the Japanese as aggressors, failing to distinguish between Japanese and Japanese-Americans
Although Americans had grown disgruntled with the Japanese, many blamed the American government for letting a foreign nation overtake the United States. Blame was also placed on successful Japanese enterprises that had inserted themselves within the United States, but not the Japanese populace as a whole. As the Japanese economy continued to thrive, President George H. W. Bush visited the Prime Minister of Japan. Although he had been fine earlier in the day, playing tennis with the Emperor, during a dinner held in his honor he suddenly slumped forward before getting sick on the Japanese Prime Minister’s lap. Although Bill Clinton, Bush’s main opponent in the upcoming presidential election, benefited greatly from the event, the event showed where Americans placed their blame and anger against the Japanese: with the United States government, itself, and its weakness. Rather than the United States as the nation with the greatest amount of economic power, the Japanese had stepped away from their proper place, overtaking them in a sphere where they assumed they were supreme.
While Japan had been promoting its economy, the United States had not acted defensively or proactively. That this sentiment was widely felt in the US and can be seen in the lack of political cartoons. In the 1980s, it was not Japan that should be mocked, as that right was reserved for America. As George H. W. Bush was spoofed on a 1992 cold open of Saturday Night Live following the incident titled “Bad Sushi”, there was no mention of the Japanese or their wrongdoings. Instead, the Prime Minister was shown attempting to help Bush as he was sick, which was more than Bush’s wife did in the skit as she tried to escape the scene by crawling across the table. The American populace believed that if anyone was to blame for the poor economic situation that they had found themselves in at the end of the century, it was American politicians themselves.
Although the image of the Japanese had shifted during the late 20th century in the United States, tensions fell to the wayside within the last eight years of the 1990s. Although the economic bubble in Japan had continued to grow, it burst in the early 1990s, leading to what is now referred to as the ‘Lost Decade’ by many economists. By early 1992, the Washington Post reported that while Americans’ attitudes towards the Japanese had been predominantly negative,
the Tokyo stock market [in 1992] is roughly half its peak reached in late 1989 (38,916 on the Nikkei index, which closed Tuesday at 19,918). Land values are declining. In 1991, business bankruptcies rose 66 percent. A dreaded word is being spoken in Tokyo: recession. And Japan's problems are mostly self-inflicted. An orgy of easy credit and speculation drove the economy into a frenzied boom that's now collapsing, [51]
a fault of no one’s but their own. As quickly as American anxieties had risen, the new economic situation in Japan quelled them once again as Japan returned to its proper place. Three years later, in 1995, the Associated Press reported that “Mitsubishi Estate [had] bought [Rockefeller Center] when the New York real estate market was at its height. Now Rockefeller Center is worth about half what it was,” [52] yet Mitsubishi was still expected to pay the $1.3 billion mortgage while only banking 30% of the profit per square foot of the building that they had expected. Although it was not expected that companies like Mitsubishi would suffer, well-known financial issues were a blow to the Japanese ego, something that Americans rejoiced in. If nothing else, it showcased that the Japanese had attempted to expand into the global economic area too fast rather than remaining in their proper place by America’s side. While the time Bush vomited on the Japanese prime minister continues to hold a “special place in the annals of American presidential goofs, it also entered the Japanese lexicon—the colloquial phrase bushuru, which roughly translates to ‘to pull a Bush,’ became a popular slang term [in Japan] for vomiting in the wake of the incident,” [53] However, the tensions during the 1980s were soon forgotten as Japan returned to its proper place at the United State’s side.
[1] Jack Rosenthal, “Sushi at the Harvard Club,” November 2, 1981, The New York Times, The Editorial Notebook.
[2] Jack Rosenthal, “Sushi at the Harvard Club,” November 2, 1981, The New York Times, The Editorial Notebook.
[3] Mike Royko, “Ballpark Sushi Marks the Beginning of the End,” St. Petersburg Times, March 22, 1989.
[4] Shannon J. Wall, “Oil and the 'Economic Pearl Harbor',” The New York Times, October 21, 1981.
[5] Alexandru Arba “Favorite sports to watch in Japan as of September 2021,” Statista, accessed May 30, 2022, https://www.google.com/search?q=most+popular+sport+in+japan&oq=most+popular+sport+in+&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0i20i263i512j0i512l8.6506j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
[6] JCM, “Return of the Great Co-Prosperity Sphere?” Pacific Daily News, December 7, 1976.
[7] Shannon J. Wall, “Oil and the 'Economic Pearl Harbor',” The New York Times, October 21, 1981.
[8] Shannon J. Wall, “Oil and the 'Economic Pearl Harbor',” The New York Times, October 21, 1981.
[9] Shannon J. Wall, “Oil and the 'Economic Pearl Harbor',” The New York Times, October 21, 1981.
[10] Steve Lohr, “How the U.S. Struck Out in Japan,” The New York Times, October 25, 1981.
[11] Steve Lohr, “How the U.S. Struck Out in Japan,” The New York Times, October 25, 1981.
[12] “Auto Mileages Listed For ‘77 Cars, Trucks,” The Anniston Star, September 26, 1976.
[13] “Top Vehicle Manufacturers in the US Market, 1961-2016,” Knoema, accessed May 27, 2022, https://knoema.com/infographics/floslle/top-vehicle-manufacturers-in-the-us-market-1961-2016
[14] “Toyota's Sales Steady in U.S.” The New York Times, May 28, 1980.
[15] Reginald Stuart, “Ford, G.M. Laying Off 30,000 More,” The New York Times, November 9, 1979.
[16] Reginald Stuart, “Gas Crisis Spurs Layoffs in Auto Industry,” The New York Times, May 29, 1979.
[17] Alan S. Lenhoff, “Judge Splits Decision on Pinto Motions,” Detroit Free Press, January 15, 1980.
[18] Stephen Franklin and Marcia Stepanek, “Crash Victims Going For Big Stakes,” Detroit Free Press, May 22, 1983.
[19] Stephen Franklin and Marcia Stepanek, “Crash Victims Going For Big Stakes,” Detroit Free Press, May 22, 1983.
[20] T.R. Reid, “Hammering America’s Image,” The Washington Post, March 8, 1992.
[21] T.R. Reid, “Hammering America’s Image,” The Washington Post, March 8, 1992.
[22] Nickie McWhirter, “A Lesson–and a License–That Kids Should Never Get,” Detroit Free Press, March 25, 1983.
[23] Nickie McWhirter, “A Lesson–and a License–That Kids Should Never Get,” Detroit Free Press, March 25, 1983.
[24] “Vincent Chin: Isn’t Life a Civil Right?” Detroit Free Press, May 18, 1987, From Our Readers.
[25] Judith Cummings, Detroit Asian-Americans Protest Lenient Penalties for Murder,” The New York Times, April 26, 1983.
[26] Ezra F. Vogel, “Japan as Number One: Lessons for America,” Harvard University Press, accessed May 27, 2022, https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674366299#:~:text=Japan%20as%20Number%20One%20suggests,rethinking%20its%20own%20societal%20difficulties.
[27] John Curtis Perry, “Please, Japan, Return The Favor: Occupy Us,” The New York Times, March 4, 1981.
[28] John Curtis Perry, “Please, Japan, Return The Favor: Occupy Us,” The New York Times, March 4, 1981.
[29] John Curtis Perry, “Please, Japan, Return The Favor: Occupy Us,” The New York Times, March 4, 1981.
[30] Wylie Gerdes, “Ford Dream Lives at Rouge Steel,” Detroit Free Press, January 31, 1985.
[31] Bob Thomas, “Columbia Purchase Gives Sony Treasured Movies,” The Napa Valley Register, September 28, 1989.
[32] Elaine Kurtenback, “Sony Mess Reflects Gadgets-Entertainment Gap,” Associated Press, December 26, 2014.
[33] Owen Moritz, “Easy As ABC,” Daily News, September 18, 1986.
[34] Neil Barsky, “Japanese to Purchase Mobil HQ,” Daily News, $250M For Oil Giant’s Building Is Latest Real Estate Deal.
[35] Bill Mendenez, “Cash Rich Japanese Step Up Purchase of U.S. Property,” The San Francisco Examiner, September 28, 1986.
[36] Bill Mendenez, “Cash Rich Japanese Step Up Purchase of U.S. Property,” The San Francisco Examiner, September 28, 1986.
[37] Bill Mendenez, “Cash Rich Japanese Step Up Purchase of U.S. Property,” The San Francisco Examiner, September 28, 1986.
[38] Robert J. Cole, “Japanese Buy New York Cachet With Deal for Rockefeller Center,” The New York Times, October 31, 1989.
[39] “Rockefeller Center Deal by Japanese Firm Draws Mixed Reaction in N.Y.” The L.A. Times, November 1, 1989.
[40] “Rockefeller Center Deal by Japanese Firm Draws Mixed Reaction in N.Y.” The L.A. Times, November 1, 1989.
[41] “Rockefeller Center Deal by Japanese Firm Draws Mixed Reaction in N.Y.” The L.A. Times, November 1, 1989.
[42] James Fallows, “Containing Japan,” The Atlantic, May 1989.
[43] James Fallows, “Containing Japan,” The Atlantic, May 1989.
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[46] “Remarks on Signing the Bill Providing Restitution for the Wartime Internment of Japanese-American Civilians,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, Accessed April 22, 2022, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-signing-bill-providing-restitution-wartime-internment-japanese-american.
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[53] History.com Editors, “President George H.W. Bush vomits on the Prime Minister of Japan,” accessed April 24, 2022, A&E Television Networks, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/george-bush-vomits-on-prime-minister-of-japan.